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Funding Financial Inclusion: Institutional Logics and the Contextual 
Contingency of Funding for Microfinance Organizations 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Microfinance is a promising tool for addressing the grand challenge of global poverty. Yet, while 
many studies have examined how microfinance loans affect poor borrowers, we know little about 
how microfinance organizations (MFOs) themselves finance their lending activities. This is an 
important oversight because most MFOs do not self-fund their lending, but rather rely on loans 
from external funders. To better understand microfinance funding, we apply and extend the 
institutional logics perspective to analyze the lending practices of commercial and public 
funders, who together provide most of the capital for global microfinance. We argue that these 
funders adhere to financial and development logics, respectively, and this leads them to invest in 
different types of MFOs. Yet, in the face of uncertainty, we suggest that the practices motivated 
by these logics will start to converge in ways that are problematic for a nation’s microfinance 
sector. Using a proprietary database of all traceable loans to MFOs from 2004 to 2012, we find 
strong support for our hypotheses. Our findings show that the relationship between institutional 
logics and organizational practices is contextually contingent, and that this insight contributes 
important understanding about the efficacy of microfinance as a poverty-reduction tool.  
(196 words) 
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Over the past several decades, microfinance has emerged as a globally popular tool to 
reduce poverty. By providing small loans, microfinance organizations (MFOs) help to alleviate 
financial constraints for the poor and support consumption choices that increase household 
welfare and/or provide avenues for future ongoing income (Yunus, 1999). Today, MFOs operate 
in almost every nation of the world and collectively account for an estimated US$60-100 billion 
in yearly loans (Lahaye, Rizvanolli, & Dashi, 2012; Luminis, 2012). 
The ability for microfinance to effectively combat poverty depends, in large part, on its 
ability to reach markets where individuals who need capital can obtain it. At its most basic, there 
are three key actors in the microfinance industry: borrowers, who apply for and receive loans; 
MFOs, which issue loans to borrowers; and funders, which supply capital to MFOs. To date, 
most research has focused on the first two. While this has generated useful insight about how 
MFOs operate and the effects they have on poor borrowers, we know little about how MFOs 
fund their operations. This is an important oversight, as most MFOs are unable to mobilize 
deposits to finance their lending and thus require external funds to meet their financial and social 
objectives. As such, access to funding is a critical factor in determining the overall health of the 
microfinance industry, as well as its efficacy as a poverty-reduction tool. 
Research on capital acquisition by profit-seeking firms has found that investors are 
attracted to organizations that pose low investment risk and have the potential to generate strong 
returns (e.g., Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008). Yet in microfinance it is important that 
there are also funders who support sectoral development and social outreach. Reflecting this, 
practitioner research has argued that the health and impact of a nation’s microfinance sector rely 
on contributions from two main types of funders: commercial funders, which raise private capital 
to invest in MFOs; and public funders, which channel governmental funds to MFOs (Reille, 
Forster, & Rozas, 2011). Researchers have assumed these funders have different interests and 
lending practices, but this has not been subjected to rigorous empirical analysis. Academic 
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studies have mostly examined factors that affect the price of funding in a nation (Garmaise & 
Natividad, 2013; Tchuigoua, 2014). Practitioner studies have differentiated among funders but 
offer conflicting accounts about their lending practices (Gonzalez, 2010; Von Stauffenberg & 
Rosas, 2011). Hence, despite expected differences in their objectives, we know little about the 
actual lending behavior of different funder types, how their behavior might vary across contexts, 
or the effect their behavior has on a nation’s microfinance sector.  
To help address these questions, we develop a theoretical approach that applies and 
extends insights about institutional logics, which are sets of shared beliefs that rationalize the 
value of particular goals and interests (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). In recent years, 
logics have become a popular tool for explaining organizational action. This work argues that 
logics shape action because they are embedded in the cognition of an organization’s decision-
makers, providing them with a framework that guides attention and helps to discern appropriate 
behavior in a given context (Almandoz Rios, 2014). Thus, within the same field or industry, 
stable differences are often observed in the practices of organizations that adhere to different 
logics (e.g., Pahnke, Katila, & Eisenhardt, 2015). We apply this framework to microfinance 
funding to generate baseline predictions about the lending behavior of different types of funders.  
Still, we argue that stopping here would provide a partial account, as it overlooks the 
possibility that the link between logics and practices is contextually contingent. While most 
accept that logics can support a variety of practices, studies to date have focused on idiosyncratic 
behavioral shifts that result from learning, random drift, or strategic deviation within a given 
context (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). Yet we know that firms often 
operate in multiple environments (Vasudeva, Zaheer, & Hernandez, 2013) and that practices can 
shift in response to local contingencies (Boxenbaum & Battilana, 2005). Extending this, we 
suggest that firms that adhere to a particular logic may behave in systematically different ways in 
different contexts. To this end, our argument connects the logics perspective with research on 
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how organizations respond to uncertainty in their external environment. Uncertainty disrupts the 
link between an organization’s actions and expected outcomes, creating an impetus for strategic 
change (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009). We suggest that 
because logics shape how decision-makers perceive and respond to the environment, attention 
will shift in response to uncertainty leading to behavioral changes that are guided by a firm’s 
orienting logic. In short, the practices seen as appropriate for pursuing a given set of interests 
may differ in placid versus uncertain contexts. This is germane to our study, as microfinance 
funders—like many organizations that work to address social challenges—operate in nations 
where there are varying levels of political and economic uncertainty (Marquis & Raynard, 2015). 
To apply our theory, we first distinguish between commercial and public funders as the 
main capital providers in global microfinance. Based on the practitioner literature, as well as 
interviews with over 30 industry informants, we discern the logics that these funders adhere to 
and use this to make predictions about their lending behavior. We argue that commercial funders 
adhere to a financial logic that emphasizes investment return and supports a focus on large, 
financially strong MFOs. By comparison, public funders adhere to a development logic that 
prioritizes the health and efficacy of a nation’s microfinance sector and thus favors small, not-
yet-sustainable MFOs that do not appeal to commercial funders (Griffith & Evans, 2012).  
As a nation becomes more uncertain, we predict that commercial funders will place more 
emphasis on MFO size and less on financial performance: large MFOs are likely to be viewed as 
stable and thus more likely to provide the funder with its desired financial return. However, past 
performance has less predictive power in such contexts, making it a less-reliable investment risk 
indicator (Davis et al., 2009). We also predict MFO size will become important to public funders 
as uncertainty rises. These funders rely on capital recovery to sustain their development efforts; 
if an MFO defaults on its loans, funders have less money to invest in subsequent projects 
(Griffith & Evans, 2012). Moreover, if an MFO becomes insolvent, it does not contribute to a 
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healthy microfinance sector. Thus, from the funder’s perspective, lending to large MFOs is a 
pragmatic way to support sector development under uncertainty. We thus expect the lending 
practices of commercial and public funders to converge as uncertainty rises, even as the two are 
guided by different logics. Given that the need for microfinance rises when a nation becomes 
volatile and that sector growth and outreach are constrained when funding clusters in large 
MFOs (Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011; Wiesner & Quien, 2010), our arguments expose a 
challenge for global microfinance with potential implications for millions of poor borrowers.  
We test our arguments using a proprietary database of all traceable loans made between 
funders and MFOs from 2004 to 2012. We model the amount and type of funding received by 
each MFO each year and use country-fixed effects to isolate the effect of changing uncertainty. 
Our results, along with numerous robustness checks and supplementary analyses, provide strong 
support for our predictions. Our approach contributes understanding about the link between 
institutional logics and organizational practices by showing that, while logics shape action, the 
outcomes this yields may differ in systematic ways as the environment changes. By applying this 
argument, we also show the contextual nature of microfinance funding and generate a number of 
practical insights that may help increase the efficacy of microfinance as a poverty-reduction tool.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Microfinance Funding and Poverty Reduction 
Banks face high transaction costs when making and monitoring small loans; as a result, 
the poor are generally excluded from the formal financial system. This increases exposure to 
financial uncertainty, makes it difficult to start businesses, and forces the poor to rely on 
exploitative local lenders—all of which contribute to enduring poverty (Ledgerwood, Earne, & 
Nelson, 2013). Originally, microfinance worked to address the exclusion problem by providing 
small loans designed to help the poor start and grow micro-enterprises. The rationale was that 
operating revenue from these businesses could be used to repay the loan, while also creating an 
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ongoing source of sustainable income. The sector has since developed a less-restrictive lending 
focus and now provides a more expanded set of services to the poor (Ledgerwood et al., 2013).  
Not surprisingly, there has been considerable scholarly attention examining the impacts 
of microfinance, with a number of studies highlighting its positive effects. There is evidence that 
loans help the poor to absorb unforeseen expenses and foster a long-term orientation in their 
consumption decisions (Karlan & Zinman, 2010). Per the sector’s original focus, studies have 
also shown that microfinance supports the creation and growth of small businesses. While there 
is variance in the success of these ventures, the net effect is typically a contribution to household 
income (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, & Kinnan, 2015). Microfinance also delivers benefits by 
focusing on women borrowers. On average, women dedicate a larger portion of loan proceeds to 
health and education expenses, both of which contribute to poverty reduction (Angelucci, 
Karlan, & Zinman, 2012). For unmarried women, loans also provide an avenue for economic 
participation outside of the informal or illegal economy (Mair, Marti, & Ventresca, 2012).
1
  
 While it is important to understand how microfinance affects borrowers, the question of 
how MFOs finance their lending activities has been largely overlooked. This omission is 
important because, whereas banks finance their lending through deposits, most MFOs cannot 
accept deposits and thus depend on external funders for the capital required to make loans and 
grow their operations (Morduch, 2000). In total, MFOs receive about US$30 billion per year in 
funding, mostly from interest-bearing loans.
2
 Although the relative breakdown varies by region, 
it is estimated that about 80 percent of this funding reaches poor borrowers (Lahaye et al., 2012). 
Thus, for most MFOs, lending capacity is a direct function of external capital received.  
In addition to organization-level implications, the overall health and impact of a nation’s 
microfinance sector are determined, in part, by how funds are allocated among MFOs. It is 
                                                          
1
 Importantly, there are several studies highlighting concerns and challenges associated with microfinance. For 
example, see Battilana & Dorado (2010), Karim (2011), Polgreen & Bajaj (2010), and Viada & Gaul (2012). 
2
 Estimates suggest that the overall value of debt financing in microfinance outpaces other instruments, such as 
grants and equity, by a ratio of about five to one (Lahaye, Rizvanolli, & Dashi, 2012). 
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important that each nation’s sector comprises many well-functioning and socially committed 
MFOs, as this leads to greater loan volumes, higher overall outreach levels, and competition that 
promotes better service and lower interest rates (e.g., Lützenkirchen, Weistroffer, & Speyer, 
2012). For this to happen, though, funding needs to be available not just to large, financially 
sustainable MFOs but also to those that are small, highly committed to social outreach, not yet 
self-sustaining, and more likely to default on their loans (Reille et al., 2011; Wiesner & Quien, 
2010). Accomplishing this goal therefore necessitates the existence of funders that are willing to 
accept more risk in their investments in order to meet these development objectives.  
To date, however, there has been little research examining the lending practices of 
different types of microfinance funders. A handful of academic studies have examined the 
overall price of financing in a country, irrespective of lender differences. This work has found 
that MFOs pay less interest when their nation has strong market-supporting institutions 
(Tchuigoua, 2014) and when loans come from nations that are politically similar to their own 
(Garmaise & Natividad, 2013). By comparison, practitioner research has differentiated between 
funders, identifying two main types: commercial and public. Yet this work casts doubt as to 
whether the two lend to different types of MFOs (Gonzalez, 2010; Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 
2011). Thus, while a strong microfinance sector requires that capital be available to support 
diverse MFOs, we have little insight into the practices of different funders or the conditions 
under which their behavior creates a healthy funding ecology in a nation. We argue that an 
approach based in institutional logics can help advance insight here, as it directs attention to the 
sources of rationality that underpin an organization’s interests, and thus provides leverage for 
theorizing about the aims of different funders as well as the MFO attributes that they attend to 
and value when making investment decisions (Thornton et al., 2012). 
An Institutional Logics Approach to Microfinance Funding 
The institutional logics perspective focuses on explaining how organizational action is 
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shaped by shared sets of beliefs—or cultural influences—that rationalize the value of particular 
interests and identities (Thornton et al., 2012). As with other neo-institutional approaches, 
studies have shown that logics create expectations for how an organization should appropriately 
act within a given context and work through a variety of external channels to promote aligned 
action (Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013). A unique feature of the logics approach, though, is the 
recognition that logics are also internalized by organization members and thus affect how 
managers allocate their attention, interpret external stimuli, and make decisions (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999). As scholars increasingly come to recognize that organizations face institutionally 
complex environments that comprise conflicting external demands, the link between logics and 
managerial cognition has taken on heightened importance for understanding organizational 
behavior (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 
2011; Wry & York, 2015; Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, & Miller, 2016). In this regard, there is 
evidence that logics affect which external influences a firm attends and responds to (Pache & 
Santos, 2013), while also guiding its action across diverse institutional contexts (Vasudeva et al., 
2013). In short, scholars have posited a close and mutually constitutive link between logics and 
action, where a firm’s internal operations and external practices are traced to “logic-consistent 
decisions that reinforce extant…identities and strategies” (Lounsbury, 2007: 289).  
Notably for our purposes, there is also evidence that different types of organizations 
within a field or industry may adhere to different logics, and behave in consistently different 
ways as a result. Providing evidence of this, Rao and colleagues (2003) found that French 
restaurants differed with regard to cooking practices, ingredients, and dishes produced depending 
on whether they adhered to the logic of classical or nouvelle cuisine. Similar patterns have been 
found among investment firms. For example, Lounsbury (2007) found that the strategies of 
different mutual funds were anchored in either professional or trustee logic: the former used 
active money management practices, while the latter focused on long-term investing. There is 
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also evidence that banks that operate according to community logic are more likely than national 
banks to lend to local businesses and prioritize local relationships (Almandoz Rios, 2014; 
Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). Pahnke and colleagues (2015) showed that venture capitalists, 
corporate investors, and government agencies each function according to a unique logic that 
leads to practices that variously enable or constrain innovation among fund recipients.  
While these studies show that logics can shape investment practices, in each case funders 
are investing in commercial businesses with the aim of generating financial returns. Yet, in 
contexts like ours, where organizations seek financial and social returns (see also Battilana & 
Lee, 2014), it is important to consider the varying, and nonpecuniary, motives that different 
funders might have. We thus build on existing work by drawing on the microfinance literature, 
as well as interviews with over 30 industry informants, to discern the logics that motivate 
different microfinance funders and use this to make predictions about their investment behavior. 
We began by interviewing funders with whom we had preexisting relationships, and asked each 
to introduce us to others that they knew. Next, we identified contacts for the remaining funders in 
our database and sent each an interview invitation. Overall, this yielded 34 interviews, conducted 
either online or by phone, 19 of which were with commercial funders. Table 1 summarizes each 
lender type, including information on subtypes and the scale of funding provided. As with 
previous studies, (e.g., Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011), our research focuses on commercial 
and public funders because they account for the large majority (97%) of microfinance funding.
3
      
-----Insert Table 1 about here-----  
Commercial Funders and Financial Logic 
Commercial funders are primarily investment funds and private equities that raise money 
from private investors to lend to MFOs; traditional banks that lend to MFOs are also included in 
this category. While there are local commercial funders in most nations, the majority—funds and 
                                                          
3
 We also analyzed lending practices for charitable funders (see https://mfifunding.wordpress.com).  
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private equities in particular—are based in the United States or Western Europe (Sapundzhieva, 
2011). After performing local due-diligence, most funding decisions are made by an investment 
committee at the funder’s head office (Gonzalez, 2010). As a category, commercial funders are 
the largest and fastest-growing capital source in global microfinance (Lahaye et al., 2012).  
Commercial funders’ basis of interest. The interests of commercial funders are guided 
by a financial logic that prioritizes investment return. This is obvious for banks, which base their 
lending decisions on an analysis of borrower repayment capacity. Investment funds and private 
equities may also aspire to “do good” with their investments but, as with banks, lending 
decisions follow a financial calculus (Lützenkirchen et al., 2012). For most, social returns come 
simply from investing in microfinance, while others apply a set of screens to ensure money is not 
going to MFOs with usurious lending practices (Glisovic & Moretto, 2012). In either case, once 
a consideration set of potential investment targets has been cultivated, the aim is to achieve 
market or near-market returns that generate revenue for the funder and entice people to invest in 
their products. For instance, BlueOrchard (2015), a microfinance investment fund, advertises that 
it helps “investors obtain strong financial returns while contributing to financial inclusion in 
emerging economies.” Describing in more detail what this means from the funder perspective, 
many of our interviewees gave candid explanations for why financial returns are crucial. Per one 
fund manager, “[We’re] like any other commercial lender; if we lose people’s money or miss the 
return we’re promising, there’s no way we’ll be able to raise another fund.” Said another, “We 
need returns to capital and need to make sure we’re involved with [MFOs] who can ensure 
this…it’s a pure investment case driving our decisions.” Covering the entire investment process, 
a private equity manager told us “We start by applying screens...once we’ve got the initial 
consideration set put together, we need to [look] for the best bets.”  
Commercial funders’ basis of action. Microfinance funders face the risk that an MFO 
(i.e., borrower) will not be able to fulfill the obligations of the loan agreement. Thus, given their 
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interests, it is reasonable to expect that commercial funders will focus their attention on MFOs 
that pose the least risk of defaulting on their loans (Gonzalez, 2010). As in other investment 
contexts, there is evidence that size and financial performance are core indicators of an MFO’s 
default risk (Berk, 1995; Fama & French, 2012; Petersen & Rajan, 1994).
4
  
Size acts as a proxy for a number of hard-to-observe risk factors. Studies routinely find 
that large firms have less-volatile performance (Berk, 1995). Larger firms are also thought to be 
more legitimate (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), of higher status (Haveman, 1993), and endowed 
with a greater amount of slack resources (George, 2005). Size is also a visible indicator that is 
easy to compare across organizations and gives evidence of past success and future stability 
(Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010). As such, it is commonly linked to organizational stability and 
performance (see Josefy, Kuban, Ireland, & Hitt, 2015). In microfinance, large MFOs are also 
more likely to be integrated into a nation’s banking sector, which helps to buffer against liquidity 
concerns (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009; Reille & Forster, 2008).  
By comparison, financial performance is a direct indicator of a firm’s solvency and a 
strong proxy of its ability to repay loans (Fama & French, 2012). Studies suggest that 
performance is closely attended to by organizational decision-makers, who are generally more 
interested in partnering with and investing in firms that have strong versus weak performance (Li 
& Rowley, 2002; Wry, Lounsbury, & Jennings, 2014). Furthermore, and germane to our context, 
the influence of financial performance in such decisions appears to be particularly strong in 
emerging markets (Geringer, 1991; Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000).  
Reflecting this, the practitioner literature suggests that microfinance funders rely heavily 
on size and financial performance to assess an MFO’s riskiness (Mersland & Strom, 2010; 
                                                          
4
 Though it is common for individuals to use the terms “risk” and “uncertainty” interchangeably, some scholars have 
attempted to differentiate the two constructs. Following Knight (1921)—and consistent with the language used by 
the funders we spoke with—we treat risk as a condition in which an actor can assign probabilities to potential 
outcomes. In our context, the primary risk confronting funders is the probability that an MFO will be unable to pay 
back the loan and thus defaults. Conversely, uncertainty is a condition in which outcomes are unknowable and thus 
outcome probabilities cannot be assigned a priori (Knight, 1921; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007). Based on this 
distinction, in our case uncertainty tends to exacerbate the investment risks faced by microfinance funders. 
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MicroRate, 2013).
5
 As a fund manager told us, “We like big and stable MFOs…ones that are the 
key players in their market.” Another fund manager remarked, “[I invest in] big MFOs [because 
they] are more likely to have experience, successful business models, and an established 
customer base.” Each commercial funder we spoke to also reported looking closely at an MFO’s 
financial position before investing. Stated plainly by a private equity manager, this meant that 
“for us to even look at you, you need to be clearly beating the market,” while another reported 
that “we like [MFOs] with a good loan book and sound fundamentals because they’re the most 
likely to get our money back to us.” Based on these considerations, we predict the following:  
Hypothesis 1. Within a country, the (a) size and (b) financial performance of an MFO is 
positively associated with the amount of loans it receives from commercial funders. 
Public Funders and Development Logic 
Public funders include government departments and aid agencies, as well as development 
finance institutions (DFIs). These funders are typically seeded with an endowment from one or 
more national governments, from which they offer subsidized loans to ventures deemed too risky 
for commercial investors (Griffith & Evans, 2012). Public funders may be local or foreign and, 
as with commercial funders, investment decisions are typically centralized in the organization’s 
head office (Gonzalez, 2010; Hoffman, 1998). These funders were among the first to invest in 
microfinance and remain a key capital source (Lafourcade, Isern, Mwangi, & Brown, 2006). 
Public funders’ basis of interest. Public funders operate according to a development 
logic, where the primary aim is to support the health and social impact of a nation’s microfinance 
sector (Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011). To this end, they are interested in fostering the growth 
and sustainability of target organizations, thus contributing to the emergence of more healthy 
MFOs in a nation and the increased competition and social outreach this brings (Otero & Rhyne, 
1994). Revenue from these loans is reinvested to support the funder’s ongoing development 
                                                          
5
 Some research in microfinance has identified a third factor that can be used to assess MFO riskiness: transparency, 
which reflects the quality of an organization’s financial reporting. Because we have no a priori expectation that 
funders will differ in their preference for MFO transparency, we only hypothesize relationships between size and 
financial performance on the one hand and funder type on the other. We control for transparency in our analyses.  
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efforts (Griffith & Evans, 2012). Hence, though loans are made on a cost-recovery basis, public 
funders are not financially motivated in the same way as commercial funders. Capturing this 
well, Goodman (2007: 21) notes that “[public funders] make capital available to [MFOs] through 
sustainable mechanisms to support their development and growth…typical financial targets [are] 
to maintain the original capital invested.” This was echoed by our interviewees, such as one DFI 
officer who reported that, “The whole investment process is different than for commercial 
funders…[we look] to fund growth and capacity building.” Offering further insight into the 
importance of these aims, another interviewee asserted, “We’re a mission-driven organization 
and this means [we’re] interested in developing the sector and…supporting poverty alleviation.”  
Public funders’ basis of action. To pursue their development aims, public funders 
espouse a lending focus that targets MFOs that would not be deemed creditworthy by 
commercial lenders. Whereas commercial funders are likely to invest in large, financially strong 
MFOs, public funders focus their attention on supporting those that are small and not yet self-
sustaining (Griffith & Evans, 2012; Reille et al., 2011). The rationale is that lending to these 
MFOs can help them to expand operations and develop their internal capacities to the level 
where they are able to access commercial capital. Once this is accomplished, public funders 
move on and invest in the next round of emerging MFOs, furthering the development of a 
nation’s microfinance sector (Otero & Rhyne, 1994). As a government official told us, 
[Public funders] are the first ones into [an MFO]. We help to build capacity and are 
willing to take risks that others won’t. By focusing on emerging [MFOs], we play a 
healthy role in building up the entire sector and fostering development. 
Both the microfinance literature and our interview data thus point to a negative 
relationship between an MFO’s size and financial performance and the amount of public funding 
it receives. While some have suggested that this pattern may not materialize in practice—and 
that public and commercial funders compete to invest in the same MFOs (e.g., Abrams & Von 
Stauffenberg, 2007)—evidence for these claims is based on limited data and has not been 
subjected to empirical testing. As such, we predict the following: 
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Hypothesis 2. Within a country, the (a) size and (b) financial performance of an MFO is 
negatively associated with the amount of loans it receives from public funders. 
Environmental Uncertainty and the Shifting Relationship between Logics and Action 
Our arguments thus far reflect a fairly faithful application of the logics perspective. 
However, this theoretical approach is limited in that it does not consider that firms which adhere 
to a logic may behave in different ways under different environmental conditions. Indeed, 
although we know that firms often operate in multiple jurisdictions, research on logics and 
practice change has focused on understanding temporal shifts within specific contexts. For 
instance, studies have shown that organizations may adhere to a logic but alter their behavior 
subtly over time due to learning (Feldman & Pentland, 2003), drift (Clemens & Cook, 1999), or 
mindful deviation (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). These shifts are idiosyncratic, though, and 
unlikely to generate systemic practice changes unless successfully theorized as rational and 
appropriate in relation to a logic (Delmestri & Greenwood, 2016; Reay, Goodrick, Waldorff, & 
Casebeer, 2016; Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012). Another mechanism that may lead to 
systemic practice change is replacement of a field’s dominant logic. Typically, this is a slow and 
conflict laden process through which challengers mobilize to shift the prevailing understandings 
about what is appropriate and desirable in a field (York, Hargrave, & Pacheco, 2015). When 
successful, this creates pressure for firms to conform to new behavioral expectations (Haveman 
& Rao, 1997; Rao et al., 2003). These pressures may also motivate a firm to replace managers 
with people who adhere to the new logic and its associated practices (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).  
While it is useful to understand how organizational behavior patterns can shift as the 
practices associated with a logic change, or a new logic ascends within a field, cross-sectional 
contextual contingency is arguably just as important in settings like ours where funders are active 
across diverse nations. Indeed, there is a growing recognition in the literature that the practices 
associated with a logic may be variously effective in different contexts (Vasudeva et al., 2013). 
Studies have also shown that as practices diffuse, local firms often alter them in patterned ways 
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to increase their fit with the local environment (Boxenbaum & Battilana, 2005). Taken together, 
this work suggests that firms may be motivated to alter their behavior in response to contextual 
contingencies and that, within a given context, such behavioral shifts may be patterned rather 
than idiosyncratic. While this work has not considered that firms which adhere to a logic might 
behave differently in different contexts, we suggest this extension can be made by linking the 
logics perspective to research on environmental uncertainty. 
 Whereas institutional scholars have focused on how firms respond to changing notions of 
appropriate behavior (e.g., Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), studies of uncertainty examine how firms 
react when the environment changes in unpredictable ways (Child, 1972; Thompson, 1967). This 
work suggests that uncertainty disrupts the link between a firm’s actions and expected outcomes, 
casting doubt on the efficacy of previous strategies (Audia et al., 2000). Resource providers may 
also have trouble with inferences about a partner’s future performance in such situations because 
cause and effect become difficult to disentangle (Davis et al., 2009; Haunschild & Miner, 1997). 
These factors create an impetus for firms to change their behavior in an attempt to deal with the 
specific uncertainty being faced (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). As logics function as the lens through which decision-makers perceive and respond to 
external stimuli (Almandoz Rios, 2014), we expect that firms will alter their behavior in response 
to uncertainty and do so in ways they consider appropriate in relation to their orienting logic.  
In microfinance, this means that how different types of funders go about pursuing their 
interests may differ based on the level of uncertainty in the nations where they operate. Because 
most MFOs are located in developing nations where there are varying levels of political and 
financial uncertainty, this is an important issue (Ault & Spicer, 2014; Mair et al., 2012). We 
argue that the practices deemed appropriate according to both financial and development logics 
will shift as these two types of uncertainty increase, affecting the MFO attributes that a funder 
attends to and values when extending loans.  
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Political uncertainty. Countries have their own specific rules and regulations with regard 
to investments. These rules, and a nation’s political environment more broadly, are the outcome 
of a negotiated process whereby various interest groups negotiate, lobby, and otherwise seek to 
influence policymakers. The degree of uncertainty in this process is largely a function of the 
formal policymaking structure, which, in emerging economies, often lacks the requisite checks 
and balances to achieve political stability (Henisz & Delios, 2004). Political uncertainty thus 
reflects the possibility that political decisions or events in a country will affect the behavior or 
ownership of organizations in ways that negatively affect investment returns (Howell, 2001).  
There are two interrelated features of political uncertainty in a country that are germane 
to capital funders. The first is the quality of the political-institutional infrastructure necessary to 
facilitate business transactions. For example, regulations around property rights and contract 
enforcement provide assurances that asset ownership is respected by the law and that legal 
mechanisms are in place to ensure that contractual obligations are met. The second factor is a 
government’s ability and willingness to change these regulations. For example, the ability of a 
faction to impose radical changes in a nation’s political environment is limited by the presence of 
an impartial judiciary, democratic accountability, and bureaucratic quality. The absence of 
religious and military leaders from politics, lower levels of religious and ethnic tensions, and 
minimal levels of armed conflict are also related to political stability (Ramady, 2014). These 
conditions provide businesses with greater assurance that potentially harmful policies must pass 
through a process of checks and balances and build investor confidence by ensuring that the  
“rules of the game” in a nation are unlikely to change capriciously (Henisz, 2000; Li, 2009).  
Financial uncertainty. In addition to political uncertainty, there is also uncertainty 
associated with a country’s ability to finance its sovereign, commercial, and trade obligations. 
For example, as the amount of foreign debt increases relative to the size of the economy, a 
country’s ability to repay its debts declines (Soussanov, 2002). When this happens, a nation is 
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more apt to face financial crises such as recession and/or interest rate spikes (Arellano, 2008). 
Loan defaults are also often accompanied by exchange-rate instability, currency devaluations, 
and inflation, each of which has been shown to deter investment (Allayannis & Weston, 2001; 
Geczy, Minton, & Schrand, 1997). Supporting this, research has shown a link between financial 
stability and the investment returns achieved by foreign subsidiaries in a country (Click, 2005), 
as well as the future expected returns of domestic firms (Erb, Campbell, & Viskanta, 1996).  
Commercial Funders and Financial Logic under Uncertainty 
Although commercial funders will likely demur from entering highly volatile countries, 
most recognize that investing in MFOs involves being active in nations with varying amounts of 
political and financial uncertainty (BlueOrchard, 2015; MicroRate, 2013). There is still the issue 
for funders, though, of how to respond if uncertainty rises in a nation where they are active. One 
option is simply to exit. Yet, in the microfinance context, this option is unlikely to be attractive. 
Commercial funders dedicate considerable time to building expertise and relationships in a focal 
country; many also have local offices with employees who monitor their national investments 
(BlueOrchard, 2015; Lützenkirchen et al., 2012). These are significant commitments and do not 
transfer easily to other contexts. Exiting a nation may also make reentry difficult when 
uncertainty recedes. Reflecting this, a fund manager told us the following: 
If a country where we have a position starts to become more uncertain with regard to the 
economic or political climate, we start to get nervous. We’re not going to pull out unless 
absolutely necessary [though]…you start to look like the big bad capitalist guys if you 
just leave. It would make it hard for us to come back and we want to avoid that.  
 With this in mind, we expect that commercial funders will pursue financial returns under 
uncertainty by shifting their lending behavior. To this end, studies have found that uncertainty 
creates ambiguity about the link between an organization’s past and future performances, as 
strategies that create strong performance in one environment may be ineffective in other contexts 
(Audia et al., 2000). Moreover, Davis et al. (2009) found that many strategies produced strong 
performance in stable environments but only a few remained effective when uncertainty 
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increased. Studies also suggest that successful organizations can be reluctant to make strategic 
changes (Boeker, 1997; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), and this is problematic when the environment 
changes. For example, Audia et al. (2000) found that greater success leads firms to persist with 
past strategies after major environmental change, negatively affecting subsequent performance. 
 As a consequence of past performance losing predictive validity in uncertain contexts, 
studies suggest that resource providers are apt to shift their attention to visible, easy-to-evaluate 
quality signals such as size and status (Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Podolny, 1994) that act as 
proxies for organizational stability (Geroski et al., 2010). The bigger resource endowments of 
large organizations may also help them to weather uncertainty and successfully alter their 
strategies in response to environmental changes (Dobrev, Kim, & Carroll, 2003). This line of 
reasoning is evident in the practitioner literature on microfinance, where authors have suggested 
that MFO size creates a buffer against liquidity risks (Gonzalez, 2010), and that in uncertain 
environments “asset managers [focus] their efforts on risk management and…tightening their 
investment policies…[many move] up-market” (Glisovic & Reille, 2010).  
This interpretation was echoed by the commercial funders we spoke to. Discussing his 
firm’s response to uncertainty, an investment officer told us “we’re going to shift our local focus 
to less risky [MFOs]...big [MFOs] tend to be pretty stable; they’re better bets to ride out 
adversity, so we will be more interested in them.” Another said, “If a nation becomes more 
volatile, we’ll certainly look at adjusting our position…when you don’t know how strategies are 
going to play out, and what will be effective, size and reputation make a big difference, and these 
are highly correlated.” Clearly linking these behavioral shifts to the application of financial logic, 
a fund manager told us the following: 
We need to preserve our [financial] position…. When things get turbulent we change how 
we weight different factors…. The bottom line is that size becomes really important. You 
don’t know what’s going to work and what isn’t. A larger [MFO] is more likely to be 
stable, a stronger institution. All other indicators become really subjective and hard to 
draw inferences from. 
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As such, we expect that when political and financial uncertainty in a country rise, 
investors who adhere to financial logic will focus more on the size of potential fund recipients 
and less on past performance, as doing so should reduce risk and increase the prospect of 
preserving a return on capital.
6
 Accordingly, we predict the following:  
Hypothesis 3. When (a) political uncertainty or (b) financial uncertainty in a country 
increase, the relationship between MFO size and commercial funding will become more 
positive.  
 
Hypothesis 4. When (a) political uncertainty or (b) financial uncertainty in a country 
increase, the relationship between MFO financial performance and commercial funding 
will become less positive.  
Public Funders and Development Logic under Uncertainty 
We expect that public funders will also shift their behavior when a nation becomes more 
uncertain and do so in ways that they view as consistent with development logic. This means 
that, as with commercial funders, exit is unlikely when a national environment changes. As a part 
of their development aims, many public funders are mandated to disperse a set amount of money 
in specific regions or countries (Goodman, 2007). Beyond this, pulling their capital would 
undermine efforts to build capacity and foster stability in a nation’s microfinance sector. Indeed, 
public funders generally try to play a countercyclical role by expanding activities to prevent a 
credit crunch when a nation becomes volatile (Otero, 1999). Linking this to development logic, a 
government official told us “[public] funders try to stay committed to countries that are facing 
uncertainty; leaving would completely be against development principles.”  
However, in staying in a nation, public funders must consider the implications that 
uncertainty has for their development aims. While public funders are willing to accept higher 
levels of investment risk to pursue development aims, capital recovery is still important. This is 
related directly to development goals, particularly among the DFIs that comprise the majority of 
public microfinance funding. DFIs are endowed with sovereign funds, but these are typically not 
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 There are other ways in which a funder may manage potential investment risk, such as increasing interest rates or 
issuing shorter-term loans. We examine these possibilities in our supplementary analyses.  
20 
 
replenished by the sponsoring government (Hoffman, 1998). As such, the ability of these funders 
to pursue ongoing development aims requires them to retain and grow their capital base (Griffith 
& Evans, 2012). Government agencies also face pressure to show they are making responsible 
budget allocation decisions (Lancaster, 2008). Further, funders have a finite amount of capital to 
invest, and this means that development goals are arguably best pursued by funding MFOs that 
can endure adversity. This was supported by our interviewees, such as the government official 
who told us, “[public funders] need returns to continue investing. How do you do development 
[work] if you lose all your money?” Similarly, a DFI manager said, “If [our] investments default 
what good would that do for the sector? Development means an MFO has to be there tomorrow.”   
With this in mind, we expect that the attention of public funders will shift toward MFO 
size when uncertainty increases, as larger MFOs are more likely to be seen as able to weather 
uncertainty (Josefy et al., 2015). This was echoed by many of our interviewees, who rationalized 
a focus on larger MFOs by appealing to development aims. Said one, “When a country gets 
volatile…you need someone to prop up the cornerstone institutions…sad as it is to say, the little 
guys are going to be exposed…the top tier [MFOs] are going to be able to pay you back.” 
Delving further into the rationale for this shift, another DFI manager said this to us: 
It makes sense from a development perspective that you would move to larger [MFOs] as 
a country gets volatile to make sure you’re not getting too much exposure in your 
portfolio. If these guys go under, that’s not good for the sector, and it’s not good for us. 
The potential development impact is much higher for a larger, more stable [MFO] that is 
going to be around to help anchor the sector tomorrow than it is to [keep pumping] 
money into one that might get itself into a liquidity crunch if the country stays volatile. 
Based on this, we predict the following: 
Hypothesis 5. When (a) political uncertainty or (b) financial uncertainty in a country 
increase, the relationship between MFO size and public funding will become less 
negative.  
As we argued above, an MFO’s financial performance is not likely to be an investment 
consideration among public funders in stable environments. Because past performance is a less-
valid predictor of future performance under uncertainty (Davis et al., 2009), we do not expect 
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uncertainty to affect public funders’ reliance on this consideration when making loan decisions.  
DATA AND METHODS 
To date, research on microfinance funding has been constrained by a lack of publicly 
available data. The Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) and the Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (CGAP) both collect funding data but do not publicly disclose raw figures. 
Ratings agencies like MicroRate also collect data but only for a limited number of MFOs, most 
of which are in Latin America (Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011). Addressing this limitation, we 
were able to negotiate access to the raw MFO funding data collected by the MIX and compile a 
comprehensive database of microfinance funding.  
The MIX is a nonprofit organization that acts as the major information provider on the 
microfinance industry. Founded by the World Bank, the MIX aims to provide comprehensive, 
objective, and relevant information about microfinance that is standardized and comparable 
across countries. MIX data are reliable and have been used widely in previous studies (e.g., 
Armendariz & Morduch, 2010; Cull et al., 2009). As a part of its data-gathering efforts, the MIX 
began to track MFO funding data systematically starting in 2004. For each lending transaction, 
the MIX records the funder’s name, type, country of origin, and amount of capital lent to the 
MFO in US dollars. In some cases, the interest rate and loan term are also recorded. Following 
conventional practice, and in consultation with the MIX, we categorized each funder as a 
commercial, public, or charitable organization, as reflected in Table 1.  
The final dataset covers 891 MFOs in 92 countries that borrowed from 1,490 funders 
between 2004 and 2012. Based on our own calculations and estimates from our contacts at the 
MIX, this accounts for about 90 percent of the financing acquired by MFOs around the world 
over our analysis period.
7
 Our data thus comprise the most comprehensive, cross-sectional time-
series database of transactions between funders and MFOs that has been compiled to date.  
                                                          
7
 To calculate the coverage of our funding data, we divided the total outstanding loan amount per year by the total 
liabilities reported by MFOs in the MIX’s publicly available financial data. 
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Variable Definitions 
Dependent variables. Using data from the MIX funding database, we constructed two 
outcome variables—commercial and public capital—that respectively capture the inflation 
adjusted logged amount of capital in USD acquired by a focal MFO from these funder types in a 
specific year. In cases where an MFO did not receive any loan dollars from either a commercial 
or public funder, we set the corresponding value to 1 prior to logging.  
Independent variables. Our key independent variables are indexes that encompass 
multiple measures of both MFO size and financial performance. Unlike agencies that combine 
size, performance, and transparency indicators to form a single aggregate measure of MFO 
investment risk (MicroRate, 2013), we assembled separate indicators for each of these. 
Exploratory factor analysis verified that the indicators load onto three distinct factors and should 
be analyzed separately. We describe each indicator in Table 2.  
-----Insert Table 2 about here----- 
To validate these exploratory findings, we performed a confirmatory-factor analysis with 
maximum-likelihood estimation procedures. The expected three-factor solution was an excellent 
fit with the data (RMSEA = 0.029, CFI = 0.981, TLI = 0.969), and all factor loadings were 
significant at the .001 level. Based on this, we generated factor scores that reflect the size, 
financial performance, and transparency of each MFO in our analysis. We include transparency 
as a control variable because we expect (and find) that it is similarly relevant to all funders.  
At the country level, we included measures for political uncertainty and financial 
uncertainty based on data compiled by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Used 
widely by researchers (e.g., Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, & Siegel, 2014; Boubakri, Mansi, & 
Saffar, 2013; Dell'Ariccia & Marquez, 2010), the ICRG draws on 22 metrics and evaluates 140 
countries in terms of their political, economic, and financial uncertainty.
8
 We focus on the 
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 Note that ICRG calls these variables “risks.” However, our consultation with the data source suggests that ICRG 
does not follow the scholarly distinction between uncertainty and risk. In fact, the way ICRG approaches political 
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political and financial uncertainty scores of the countries in our database because the measure of 
economic uncertainty is highly correlated with the measure of financial uncertainty (p = .77) and 
overlaps with various control variables that we discuss below (e.g., GDP per capita).  
Political uncertainty comprises 12 measures that capture the degree of political stability 
in a country: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal 
conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, 
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality. The variable is measured on 
a 100-point scale, with higher values indicating lower uncertainty. Hence, we reverse-coded it so 
higher values denote greater uncertainty. Financial uncertainty reflects a country’s ability to meet 
its commercial and trade debt obligations. It is constructed as a 50-point scale and includes five 
components: foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage of 
exports, current account as a percentage of exports of goods and services, net international 
liquidity as months of import cover, and exchange-rate stability. Again, we reverse-coded this 
variable. To test hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, we interacted MFO size and financial performance with 
the two country-level uncertainty variables using mean-centered values.  
  Control variables. Commercial and public capital funding may relate to several factors 
not included in our hypotheses. To account for the overall wealth of the country where an MFO 
resides, we include a measure of GDP per capita (logged). Microfinance funding may also be 
influenced by the prevalence of aid already being received in the MFO country. Therefore, we 
controlled for net official development assistance (Net ODA) as a percentage of gross national 
income (Lacalle & Alfonso, 2011). Given that the degree to which a nation is economically 
integrated into the world society likely influences its ability to attract capital, we controlled for 
economic globalization, which is an index measure based on a country’s trade and investment 
flows, portfolio investment, income payments to foreign nationals, import barriers, tariff rates, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and financial risks is consistent with our definition of uncertainty provided in footnote 4. We expect the political and 
financial uncertainty of a country to exacerbate investment risks faced by commercial and public funders.  
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international trade taxes, and capital account restrictions. These data are from Dreher (2006) and 
the measure forms a 100-point scale in which higher values indicate greater globalization. 
In light of past research that has suggested cross-country similarities may affect 
microfinance funding flows (Garmaise & Natividad, 2013), we controlled for three types of 
lender-MFO country distance: economic (differences in economic development and 
macroeconomic characteristics), financial (differences in financial-sector development), and 
political (differences in political stability, democracy, and trade-bloc membership). Using data 
collected by Berry and colleagues (2010), we first calculated the average of each distance 
between the MFO country and all its lender countries, which generated an average score, 
respectively, for economic, financial, and political distance for each MFO-year. Because the 
three distance variables are highly correlated (p = 0.52-0.74), we took an overall average across 
all three and included it as a control for country distance in the models.  
In addition, one alternative explanation for our hypothesized results is that increasing 
financial and political uncertainty affects the composition of a country’s microfinance sector 
such that smaller, less-sustainable MFOs fail or are acquired, leaving only larger MFOs to 
receive funds. To account for this possibility, we included three variables based on the 
composition of a country’s microfinance sector. To control for sector size and growth, we 
included a measure of the number of new MFOs founded per country-year as well as the number 
of active MFOs. We also included a measure of microfinance industry concentration for each 
nation, which is calculated using a Herfindahl index based on each MFO’s share of assets in the 
sector. These variables reflect the vibrancy of a country’s microfinance sector, how many MFOs 
may actively be seeking funding, and whether the industry is consolidating or otherwise 
becoming more concentrated. The measures were calculated using the MIX data.  
We also include a number of MFO-level controls. Because nonprofit MFOs can accept 
charitable donations and nongovernmental organization (NGO) grants—which are not included 
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in our data—they may be less likely to seek loans (Gonzalez, 2010). Thus, we control for 
nonprofit status (coded as “1” for nonprofit). We also control for MFO age in years and 
efficiency, which is the logged number of borrowers served per loan officer of each MFO, a 
standard measure in the microfinance literature (MicroRate, 2013). As noted above, we also 
controlled for an MFO’s transparency. As detailed in Table 2, the variable is based on an MFO’s 
Diamond Score from the MIX, which rates the quality and level of transparency in financial 
reporting, and its regulatory status, which is associated with specific reporting requirements.  
Each covariate is lagged one year, with the exception of MFO age. Descriptive statistics 
and correlations are presented in Table 3. We checked for possible multicollinearity in our model 
by conducting a variance inflation factor (VIF) test. The maximum VIF score obtained was 7.82 
and the mean VIF was 2.72, both below the commonly used threshold value of 10 (e.g., 
Kennedy, 1992), indicating that multicollinearity was not a concern.
9
  
-----Insert Table 3 about here----- 
Analytic Approach 
In this study, the unit of analysis is the MFO, and the unit of observation is the MFO-
year. Our primary dependent variables are commercial and public capital. Each MFO for each 
year, therefore, has a separate observation for each dependent variable. Based on this, we ran 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models for the amount of commercial capital received 
per MFO-year, and for the amount of public capital received per MFO-year. All models include 
country-fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level and to isolate 
cross-MFO differences in capital acquisition. A fixed effects model accounts for a country’s 
unobserved characteristics that do not vary over time that may affect MFO funding. This 
specification is achieved by subtracting the values of each observation from the country mean, 
removing all between-country differences and leaving only the within-country variation to be 
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 High VIFs are not unusual with the inclusion of interaction variables as the correlations between variables and 
their interaction terms are high by design. In this case, multicollinearity does not have serious adverse consequences.  
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explained by the covariates (Wooldridge, 2006). Year-fixed effects were also included to control 
for any unobserved changes in the macro environment that might affect MFO funding over time. 
For robustness, we also analyzed the data using different model specifications, which we discuss 
in our section for robustness checks and supplemental analyses.  
RESULTS 
We present the results of our OLS analyses of commercial and public capital acquired by 
MFOs in Table 4. In model 1, we include only the controls. In models 2 through 8, we test our 
hypotheses. Model 2 includes the two hypothesized measures of MFO risk: size and financial 
performance. Models 3 and 4 add the interaction between political uncertainty and size and 
financial uncertainty and size, respectively. Model 5 includes both size interactions. Models 6 
and 7 look at the interactions between political uncertainty and performance and financial 
uncertainty and performance, respectively. Model 8 contains both performance interactions.  
As shown in model 1, both commercial and public funders loan less money to nonprofit 
MFOs as compared to for-profit ones. This is consistent with research that suggests nonprofit 
MFOs may rely more heavily on other forms of funding, such as charitable grants (Gonzalez, 
2010). There is also a positive relationship between commercial and public funding and MFO 
age and transparency. Notably, the positive impact of transparency on commercial capital 
becomes insignificant when MFO size and financial performance are also included in the model. 
This may reflect an effort among public funders to offset some of the risks associated with 
funding smaller and less financially strong MFOs by ensuring that those they do lend to have 
more transparent reporting. There are also a number of differences between commercial and 
public funders. In nations where economic globalization increased, MFOs received less money 
from public funders. MFOs in countries with more MFOs received fewer loan dollars from 
public funders, while MFOs in countries with more MFO foundings received more loan dollars 
from commercial funders. MFOs also tend to acquire more commercial capital from lenders 
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based in more economically, financially, and politically distant countries. This may reflect 
commercial capital flows from more developed countries (e.g., United States and Netherlands) to 
developing countries. In our supplemental analyses, we further investigate whether our results 
remain after accounting for the home-country effect of lenders.  
Model 1 also shows how country uncertainty affects commercial and public capital flows 
to a nation’s microfinance sector. As expected, there is little evidence of capital flight (i.e., rapid 
outflow of capital from a nation due to unfavorable events). Financial uncertainty is negatively 
and significantly related to commercial funding, but there is no effect for political uncertainty. 
Neither political nor financial uncertainty has a significant impact on public funding.  
Hypothesis 1 predicted that commercial capital will be positively related to an MFO’s (a) 
size and (b) financial performance. Results from model 2 support both predictions and show that 
commercial funders invest in MFOs that are larger and financially stronger. Holding all 
covariates at their mean level, the predicted value of commercial investment is $2,495,500.83. A 
one standard deviation increase in MFO size (0.97) raises the predicted value of commercial 
investment by about 128% ($3,194,241.06), while a one standard deviation increase in financial 
performance (0.43) raises the predicted value by about 33% ($823,515.27).  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that public funders will lend to MFOs that are (a) smaller and (b) 
less financially strong. The coefficient for MFO size is in the predicted negative direction but is 
not significant. Though the results are consistent with the argument that public funders are not 
sensitive to MFO size in their investment decisions, hypothesis 2a is not supported. Our results 
provide direct support for hypothesis 2b, though, and show that public funders are more likely to 
invest in MFOs with weaker financial performance. Holding all covariates at their mean level, 
the predicted value of public investment is $53,103.60. A one standard deviation increase in 
financial performance (0.43) lowers the predicted value by about 51% ($27,082.84). While there 
is anecdotal evidence of commercial and public funders competing to invest in the same MFOs 
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(e.g., Abrams & Von Stauffenberg, 2007), our results suggest that, on average, commercial 
capital goes to larger, financially stronger MFOs, while public capital goes to MFOs of varying 
sizes that have relatively weaker financial performance. Thus, per the logics approach, in stable 
environments commercial and public funders appear to be guided by different considerations and 
channel money to different MFOs.  
Hypothesis 3 predicted that when (a) political uncertainty and (b) financial uncertainty in 
a country increase, the relationship between commercial funding and MFO size will become 
more positive. Hypothesis 5 predicted a positive interaction between MFO size and (a) political 
uncertainty and (b) financial uncertainty for public funders, such that the relationship between 
public funding and MFO size will become less negative. The results from models 3 and 4 show 
positive and significant interactions for political uncertainty and size and financial uncertainty 
and size for both commercial and public funders, supporting hypotheses 3 and 5. Yet as models 2 
and 3 indicate, the main effect of MFO size was not significant for public funders. Hence, rather 
than the effect becoming less negative, the relationship between size and public capital becomes 
positive as political uncertainty increases. Similarly, model 4 reveals that the relationship 
between MFO size and public capital also becomes positive as financial uncertainty increases. In 
model 5, the interaction of size and political uncertainty is insignificant for public funders when 
both sets of interactions are included. Still, as we expected, the results overall show a clear 
pattern of capital flowing from both funder types to larger MFOs as country uncertainty 
increases.  
To gain more insight into the interaction effects, we plotted the significant interactions 
based on models 3 and 4 in Figure 1. We also followed Aiken and West’s (1991) procedure and 
conducted simple slope tests for significant interactive terms. In separate equations, we split the 
two uncertainty variables into two groups—low (below the mean) and high (above the mean)—
and estimated the effect of MFO size and on both commercial and public capital for both levels. 
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We find that MFO size significantly predicts commercial funding when political uncertainty is 
high (simple slope b = 3.036, p < 0.001) and when it is low (b = 1.011, p < 0.001). MFO size 
also significantly predicts public funding when political uncertainty is high (simple slope b = 
1.829, p < 0.05), but not when it is low (b = -0.505, p > 0.10). We similarly find that MFO size 
significantly predicts commercial funding when financial uncertainty is high (simple slope b = 
3.365, p < 0.001) and when it is low (b = 1.037, p < 0.001). MFO size also significantly predicts 
public funding when financial uncertainty is high (simple slope b = 8.298, p < 0.001), but not 
when it is low (b = -0.735, p > 0.10).  
In models 6 through 8, we find mixed support for hypothesis 4, which predicted that 
when political uncertainty and financial uncertainty in a country increase, the relationship 
between commercial funding and MFO financial performance will become less positive. As 
political uncertainty increases, the financial performance of MFOs becomes a less heavily 
weighted criterion in commercial funders’ lending decisions. We do not observe a similar effect 
for financial uncertainty, however. This may be due to the fact that MFOs with strong past 
financial performance are well-positioned to deal with the volatility introduced by domestic 
inflation and currency devaluations (which can be partly managed through local currency loans 
from a funder), whereas the more fundamental changes to the “rules of the game” that may 
accompany political uncertainty (North, 1991) might make it difficult to predict future financial 
performance from the past (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). As expected, the financial performance 
of MFOs does not affect public funders under higher country uncertainty.  
In Figure 2, we plot the significant interaction based on model 6. We again ran a simple 
slopes test by splitting political uncertainty into a low and high group as described above and 
estimating the effect of financial performance on commercial capital. Results show that financial 
performance is not significantly related to commercial funding when political uncertainty is high 
(b = -0.741, p > 0.10), but it is when political uncertainty is low (b = 1.733, p < 0.001). 
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-----Insert Table 4 and Figures 1 and 2 about here----- 
Robustness Checks and Supplementary Analyses  
We conducted a number of robustness checks and ran a variety of supplementary models 
to help rule out alternate explanations and bolster our findings. The results of these analyses can 
be viewed at https://mfifunding.wordpress.com.  
Alternate modeling approaches. We took steps to ensure our findings were robust to 
alternate modeling approaches. First, it is possible that the funds an MFO receives from one 
funder-type (e.g., public) may correlate with those it receives from another (e.g., commercial). If 
true, separate equations might lead to inefficient estimates, with disturbances contemporaneously 
correlated across equations (Zellner & Huang, 1962). To account for this possibility, we used 
seemingly unrelated regression, which enables joint estimation of multiple regression models, 
each with its own error term, and thus corrects for the possibility of correlation among error 
terms (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). Our findings are robust to this alternate approach. 
There may also be concerns with modeling multilevel data such as ours (i.e., MFOs 
within nations) using OLS regression because the standard errors of observations at lower levels 
of analysis may not be independent. To ensure this did not bias our results, we used hierarchical 
linear regression, or multilevel mixed-effects models (HLM). Results are consistent with our 
reported models. However, while this approach explicitly accounts for the multilevel nature of 
our data, we chose to report OLS models as our main analysis for three reasons: (1) OLS is more 
commonly used than HLM, which eases interpretation of our results among a broader readership; 
(2) the use of country-fixed effects in OLS helps to address non-independence of standard errors 
across levels of analysis, and (3) standard HLM models do not allow us to control for potential 
unobserved country-level variables as with fixed effects OLS regression (Chaplin, 2003).  
 Alternate dependent variables. Another potential issue is that, while there is precedent 
for analyzing overall investment levels in both the management (e.g., Pahnke et al., 2015; Wry et 
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al., 2014) and microfinance literatures (Gonzalez, 2010; Sapundzhieva, 2011), there are other 
potential ways to measure funding. We ran models with alternate dependent variables to ensure 
our results were robust to different measures. First, the practical value of a loan may be related to 
its term (Fama & French, 2012). For example, a $1 million loan may have different implications 
if its repayment term is two versus ten years. While data for loan term is not as complete as for 
loan amount, we constructed an alternate variable where we divided the amount of each loan by 
its term in years. Despite the data loss, results using this variable were similar to our reported 
findings. Second, while there are good reasons to expect funders respond to uncertainty by 
shifting which MFOs they lend to, the finance literature points to other potential responses; 
namely charging higher interest and/or reducing the length of the loan term (Fama & French, 
2012). While data for these measures are sparse, we ran models using interest rate and loan 
length as dependent variables. The results are more suggestive than authoritative, but there is 
little to suggest these are tools that either funder-type typically uses in response to uncertainty.  
 Alternate influences on funder behavior. In developing our approach, we argued that it 
is important to attend to the ways that environmental uncertainty affects organizational behavior. 
We recognize, however, that the environment includes unmeasured features that may affect how 
an organization acts. This issue is accounted for, in part, by our use of country-fixed effects, as 
this addresses unobserved variance in each nation where loans are made. Still, many funders are 
not based in the countries where they make loans, and this means that their behavior may also be 
affected by home-country influences. As a check, we ran separate models comparing funders in 
the United States and the Netherlands—the nations with the most microfinance funders—to all 
other foreign funders. We do not observe any systematic differences across these funders, thus 
suggesting that home-country influences do not affect our results in a meaningful way.  
In addition, while the microfinance literature suggests that commercial and public funders 
comprise meaningful groupings, as Table 1 shows, there are subtypes therein. We took steps to 
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ensure that subgroup heterogeneity was not a concern in our analysis. Models that distinguish 
between different types of commercial and public funders show that, while overall patterns are 
mostly similar across subtypes, there are some differences. Most notably, government funders 
differ from DFIs in that they seem to favor larger MFOs. Still, we urge caution when interpreting 
these results as the number of government funders in any one nation is small, making country-
fixed effects models unstable. In comparison, there are many DFIs present in most nations, and 
these collectively account for a much greater portion of overall funding (Sapundzhieva, 2011).  
 Also, while there are good theoretical reasons—supported by our interviews—to expect 
that the behavioral patterns we observe are a result of funders acting in logic-consistent ways in 
settled versus uncertain contexts, an alternate explanation is that they are changing their logics. 
Studies suggest this might happen if there is a field-level shift in expectations for how certain 
types of firms should behave, or if individual firms are motivated to replace their leadership with 
people who adhere to a different logic (Haveman & Rao, 1997; Thornton, 1999). We see little 
evidence for either. Many funders operate in multiple countries, and most investment funds, 
private equities, and DFIs are based in the United States or Western Europe (Gonzalez, 2010). 
We found nothing in the microfinance literature to suggest that expectations for how commercial 
or public funders should behave shifted over our analysis period at either the field-level, or 
individually across countries. It seems equally unlikely that funders would be motivated to alter 
their overall interests in response to uncertainty in individual host countries.  
Still, we took steps to empirically rule out this alternate explanation. As the concern with 
logic change is primarily relevant for public funders, we focused our analysis on them. First, we 
ran funder-fixed effects models comparing public funder behavior in the most (top half) and least 
(bottom half) uncertain nations in our analysis. As expected, we see a large difference in the 
coefficients for MFO size. These results suggest that behavior is being driven by country-level 
factors, rather than a logic shift at the funder-level. As a further check, we also ran models with 
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fixed effects at the funder-MFO dyad level. This specification analyzes temporal differences in 
the relationship between a given funder and a given MFO. Results show a positive significant 
interaction between MFO size and uncertainty, and a modestly significant negative interaction 
between MFO performance and uncertainty. This shows that uncertainty influences specific 
MFO investment relationships over time, providing additional evidence against logic change.       
  Finally, it is possible that MFO size and performance capture management quality, 
which might suggest a different interpretation of our results. This issue is partially accounted for 
through the inclusion of MFO transparency in our models, as there is evidence that financial 
reporting quality is associated with professional management (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). 
Still, we took the additional step of investigating this using a survey that we distributed to each 
MFO in our analysis. The goal was to collect data on each MFO’s management quality by asking 
“How important are the following to your organization: (1) formal rules and procedures, (2) 
internal financial controls, (3) employee training, (4) internal efficiency, (5) risk management, 
and (6) personal accountability?”
10
 In sum, we received 193 responses and found no systematic 
response bias (i.e., size, performance, and transparency of responding and nonresponding MFOs 
were similar). We used this data to build an additive index of MFO management quality. While 
the small sample size precluded using the variable in formal models, the measure is not highly 
correlated with MFO size (-.04) or performance (-.13). Thus, while management quality may be 
a relevant investment consideration, it appears to be distinct from our key independent variables.  
 Implications of our findings. It is important to understand the consequences of our 
finding that funding increasingly flows to large MFOs when a nation becomes more uncertain. 
An obvious implication is that smaller MFOs may find it difficult to finance their loan portfolios 
even if they are financially sustainable, which negatively affects the health of these organizations 
and can undermine competition in a country’s microfinance sector (Abrams & Von Stauffenberg, 
                                                          
10
 The practitioner literature suggests that these are key factors that reflect an MFO’s commitment to professional 
management (Ikeanyibe, 2009; MicroRate, 2013). 
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2007). There are also concerns about capital flowing primarily to larger MFOs because some 
have suggested these organizations are less committed to social outreach (Frank, 2008). 
To test this directly, we use generalized least squares models with MFO-level fixed 
effects to test the relationship between MFO size and two measures commonly used in the 
microfinance literature to assess social outreach: average loan size, which captures the extent to 
which MFOs target higher-income clients who can afford to borrow larger amounts; and the 
proportion of borrowers who are women, which captures an MFO’s willingness to target the 
most at-risk population of potential clients (Cull et al., 2009; Roberts, 2013). Results are shown 
in Table 5 and show that, on average, larger MFOs engage in significantly less outreach. The 
shifts we observe in funder behavior may thus have negative effects on a nation’s microfinance 
sector. When financial uncertainty and political uncertainty increase, loans flow to larger MFOs 
and away from others that are more highly committed to poverty reduction.  
-----Insert Table 5 about here----- 
DISCUSSION 
Over the past three decades, microfinance has emerged as an important tool to combat 
poverty. While research has focused primarily on the downstream impacts of lending to the poor 
(e.g., Banerjee et al., 2015), we analyze upstream funding flows. Doing so is important because 
most MFOs are not self-financed but rather intermediaries that aggregate external funds and 
disperse them as loans (Sapundzhieva, 2011). Although funding is a critical component of the 
microfinance ecosystem, scholarly inquiry in the area has been limited. Academics have made 
important inroads into enhancing our understanding of microfinance funding by studying cross-
national capital flows and interest rates (Garmaise & Natividad, 2010; Tchuigoua, 2014). 
Practitioner research has used largely anecdotal evidence to argue that funders compete to invest 
in the largest, financially strongest MFOs (Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011).  
By leveraging the most inclusive database that has been assembled to date, our study 
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provides the first systematic global analysis of microfinance funding. We apply insights about 
institutional logics to make baseline predictions about lending differences among commercial 
and public funders. We then extend this to consider how the types of behavior that a logic 
produces might shift in the face of growing uncertainty. As expected, we find that commercial 
and public funders lend to different types of MFOs in stable environments but that this difference 
recedes as the external environment becomes less predictable. Under such conditions, both types 
of funders focus more heavily on MFO size, whereas financial performance becomes less 
important as an investment criterion. Smaller MFOs are thus less likely to attract funding, which 
has potentially negative implications for the level of competition, service, and social outreach in 
a nation’s microfinance sector (Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011; Wiesner & Quien, 2010).  
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Implications for organizational theory. Theoretically, our primary contribution is to 
advance knowledge about the link between institutional logics and organizational practices. As 
numerous studies have shown, the logics perspective helps to explain organizational action by 
recognizing that shared beliefs about appropriate behavior—or cultural influences—are not just 
externally imposed (Scott, 2001) but are also internalized by decision-makers (Thornton et al., 
2012). As a result, firms that adhere to the same logic tend to behave in similar ways. Yet, while 
this work has enhanced our understanding about why organizations within the same field or 
industry act differently, a focus on singular contexts has contributed to theoretical blind spots 
related to the influence of broader contextual forces that may affect the types of behavior that are 
associated with a logic. Indeed, despite recognizing that firms often operate across multiple 
geographies, most studies have assumed that logics are linked to specific practices (Vasudeva et 
al., 2013). Some have suggested that this link is not always so tight and that practices may 
change due to learning (Feldman & Pentland, 2003), drift (Clemens & Cook, 1999), or active 
deviation (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). Still, behavioral shifts are theorized as idiosyncratic 
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and unlikely to generate systemic change unless actors mobilize to alter a field’s dominant logic 
(Rao et al., 2003), frame contested practices as legitimate (Smets et al., 2012), or replace a firm’s 
top managers (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). 
Our study adds insight by showing that organizations that adhere to a given logic may 
behave in reliably different ways depending on the environment they are in. Specifically, we 
connect the logics perspective with research on how firms respond to uncertainty in the external 
environment. We note that uncertainty disrupts the link between actions and expected outcomes 
and thus creates an impetus for behavioral change (Davis et al., 2009). As logics serve as the lens 
through which decision-makers interpret and respond to the external environment, we show that 
uncertainty leads to organizations altering their behavior in ways that are perceived as rational 
for pursuing their interests. As a result, the practices of firms that adhere to different logics may 
converge or diverge in different contexts. Our study therefore highlights the contextual nature of 
the link between logics and practices and helps sensitize scholars to outcomes that might be 
missed by applying the logics perspective alone.  
In this way, we go beyond studies that have examined the influence of multiple logics 
and externally imposed institutional demands as sources of practice variation (e.g., Greenwood et 
al., 2011) and direct attention to the potential for material forces to mediate the influence of 
cultural ones. This hearkens back to early organizational research where scholars endeavored to 
map the features of the external environment (Emery & Trist, 1965; Thompson, 1967) and 
suggests that this work is relevant to contemporary theoretical debates. Indeed, we show that by 
considering the material features of a firm’s environment, further insight can be gained into how  
actors use  logics as a resource to guide behavior, rather than conforming to specific behavioral 
precepts oblivious to contextual contingencies (Battilana, Sengul, Pache, & Model, 2014; Pache 
& Santos, 2013; Wry & York, 2015). We anticipate that future research will work to deepen our 
understanding of the ways in which cultural and material influences work in tandem to shape 
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organizational action. Further, while we focus on one facet of the external environment, our 
approach could be easily extended to consider how practices associated with a logic might differ 
across communities (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), societies (Vasudeva et al., 2013), or 
industries (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), thus suggesting a broad range of research applications.  
 In addition, our study has implications for research on foreign aid which, for the most 
part, has focused on understanding aggregate funding flows between countries (e.g., Fleck & 
Kilby, 2006). We show that organizational theory can help to derive novel insights by drawing 
attention to the interests and actions of the firms that provide these funds. This is important 
because a focus on overall funding flows says little about the uses and efficacy of aid dollars 
(Alesina & Dollar, 2000). The substantive work of poverty reduction is done by organizations; 
examining how they are funded has the potential to yield more granular insights that link aid 
dollars to outcomes of interest. The application of institutional logics thus has the potential to 
extend our understanding of the dynamics of foreign aid by unearthing organization-level 
variance that is masked in country-level analyses. As such, our study suggests an important role 
for organizational theory in linking organizational decision-making to practices that directly 
affect societal welfare (see also Cobb, 2016; Tilcsik & Marquis, 2013). 
Implications for microfinance research. It is generally accepted that funders consider 
MFO size, financial performance, and transparency in their funding decisions. Yet, while studies 
have suggested that these attributes are differently attended to by commercial and public funders, 
there have been no systematic predictions about the nature of these differences. In this regard, 
the institutional logics perspective usefully directs attention to the varying bases of interest and 
action among different types of funders, and thus supports predictions about which MFO features 
are attended to and valued when making lending decisions. The logics perspective also supports 
predictions about how an organization’s actions, but not interests, might change under different 
conditions, thus helping to reconcile conflicting claims about commercial and public funders 
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being competitors rather than complements (Gonzalez, 2010; Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011). 
A focus on country-level uncertainty also helps to illuminate the influence of national 
context on microfinance sector health and efficacy. Environmental uncertainties are recognized 
as important in microfinance funding decisions (BlueOrchard, 2015; Kiva, 2015), but this 
assumption has not yet been examined empirically. Our findings suggest that smaller MFOs will 
find it difficult to access funding as uncertainty rises, which can strain an MFO’s cash position 
and increase its risk of failing (Reille et al., 2011). Further, when capital flows into larger MFOs 
that engage in less social outreach, a smaller portion of external funding can be expected to reach 
very poor and female borrowers. This is especially problematic when uncertainty in a nation 
rises, as this disrupts labor markets, creates unforeseen expenses, and reduces purchasing power, 
all of which increase the likelihood of vulnerable groups falling into poverty (Adger, 2006; Sen, 
1981). There is also evidence that entrepreneurship increases in volatile environments (George, 
Kotha, Parikh, Alnuaimi, & Bahaj, 2015), furthering the need for microfinance. Our findings 
thus suggest that rising uncertainty creates more need for microfinance but works through the 
logics of different funders to undermine outreach in the sector. 
We also make an empirical contribution to microfinance research. To date, practitioners 
and ratings agencies have used composite measures that combine MFO size, performance, and 
transparency to organize MFOs into risk tiers (MicroRate, 2013; Sapundzhieva, 2011). We cast 
doubt on the empirical validity of this approach by showing that these factors do not correlate in 
a way that supports their integration. We also show that size and performance are differently 
weighted by commercial and public funders and that the importance of these variables shifts in 
different ways as a nation becomes more uncertain. The relationship between funding and MFO 
attributes is thus more nuanced and contextually dependent than what has been portrayed to date.  
Practical implications. Our study also has implications for MFOs. In particular, results 
suggest that one way in which MFOs can maintain access to funding under uncertainty is to 
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grow. Strategies such as organic growth, mergers, or extra-organizational linkages such as 
consortia or alliances may help an MFO buffer against rising uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Such strategies may be difficult, though, especially in volatile environments. We looked 
for examples of these strategies in response to uncertainty, but did not find any instances in our 
data or in the practitioner literature. It may be wise, though, for an MFO to proactively form 
alliances or expand operations in placid environments as a hedge against future uncertainty. 
Also, unreported models suggest that transparent MFOs may receive more loans from 
commercial and public funders as uncertainty increases.
11
 Thus, improved financial reporting 
may be a cost-effective way for an MFO to stabilize resource flows under uncertainty.  
Our study also has implications for public funders. While their individual actions may be 
consistent with development logic, the collective result of lending to larger MFOs as uncertainty 
rises is likely at odds with sector development. Given that the link between logics and practices 
is potentially fluid, this suggests that public funders should consider the collective outcomes of 
their behavior and work to redefine appropriate action in such contexts (Wry, Lounsbury, & 
Glynn, 2011). In this regard, one option might be to collaborate and form a reserve capital pool 
that is dedicated to helping small and financially vulnerable MFOs weather uncertainty. This is 
not unprecedented, as a number of public funders banded together during the global financial 
crisis to seed a US$500 million fund that targeted adversely affected MFOs (Reille et al., 2011).  
Further, there may be public policy mechanisms that can help reduce the adverse effects 
of political and financial uncertainty on MFO funding. Because MFO loan default is the main 
investment risk for a funder, policies and initiatives that help reduce this risk may be an effective 
means by which smaller MFOs that are more focused on social outreach can still receive funding 
when environmental uncertainty increases. To the extent that foreign governments and aid 
agencies see development finance as valuable tool for supporting a nation’s microfinance sector, 
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 These models are available to view at https://mfifunding.wordpress.com/supplementary-analyses/. 
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offering loan guarantees or other forms of protection may help to inoculate funders against 
increasing uncertainty that would otherwise alter their investment behavior. Similarly, providing 
subsidized loan insurance to smaller MFOs may help these organizations weather environmental 
shocks that affect their ability to obtain capital and repay their loans. Host country governments 
may also offer such protections, through this may become challenging as they, themselves, are 
forced to deal with rising uncertainty. Thus, while loan guarantees and insurance systems may 
create moral hazards and adverse selection, careful initiatives may lower MFO investments risks, 
thereby contributing to stable investment flows and a healthy funding ecology amid uncertainty.      
Limitations and Future Research  
There are limitations to our study that highlight opportunities for future research. 
Empirically, our analysis is limited to debt financing and thus is not inclusive of all MFO 
funding. While the vast majority of funds are issued through loans, future studies should examine 
other types of investment, such as grants and equity. Also, because our data only track loans, we 
are unable to analyze funds that support capacity building and regulatory infrastructure in a 
nation’s microfinance sector. Additional analyses will be possible as this data becomes available. 
Further, while funding is a crucial part of the microfinance ecosystem, we recognize that 
its effects are contingent on a nation’s capacity to regulate the microfinance sector (Ledgerwood 
et al., 2013). When safeguards are not in place to guard against over-borrowing by clients and 
unhealthy competition among MFOs, there is evidence that increased funding can have negative 
consequences. For instance, a glut of foreign capital contributed to a proliferation of Bosnian 
MFOs that competed with each other for business, issued progressively riskier loans, and made 
the sector susceptible to crisis (Reille et al., 2011). Thus, while uncertainty contributes to one set 
of challenges in microfinance funding, stable contexts may come with their own issues. Our 
findings should be interpreted with this consideration in mind.  
Finally, while our analysis suggests that organizations shift their behavior in ways that 
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they perceive as logic-consistent, other audiences may have a different interpretation. Indeed, 
there is evidence that some microfinance observers consider it ‘mission drift’ when public 
funders invest in large MFOs (Von Stauffenberg & Rosas, 2011). While there are no data for us 
to examine this or its implications directly, it nonetheless points to interesting avenues for future 
research. Debates about mission drift are endemic to sectors where firms pursue both financial 
and social aims (Battilana & Lee, 2014); our approach suggests this may be due to conflicting 
interpretations from internal and external audiences about what sorts of behavior are appropriate 
vis-à-vis a particular logic. We envision future research examining conflicts that arise, not just 
among groups that adhere to different logics but also among those that disagree over how to 
interpret the same logic. It would be interesting to study the challenges this presents for 
organizations, especially those pursuing pro-social aims.  
CONCLUSION 
 Microfinance is a tool with the potential to make a meaningful contribution to global 
poverty reduction. Yet in their attempts to study the impacts of microfinance loans, scholars have 
largely overlooked the question of how these loans are financed. Building on and extending the 
institutional logics perspective and using the most comprehensive database of microfinance 
funding constructed to date, we show that commercial and public funders invest in different 
types of MFOs in stable environments but these differences retreat in potentially problematic 
ways as uncertainty increases and the need for microfinance intensifies. In so doing, the research 
presented here suggests that an organizational approach can usefully illuminate processes that 
shape the efficacy of microfinance as a way to address the grand challenge of global poverty.  
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Table 1. Description and Statistics on Microfinance Funder Types 
Funder 
Type Sub-types 
# of 
Lenders* 
(%) of all 
Loans 
Avg Loan 
Size ($US)   Illustrative Mission Statements 
Public 
Government Programs and 
Aid Agencies 
 
Development Finance 
Institutions 
244 25.20%  $ 1,085,163    
Combating poverty is [our] ultimate goal... as part of Spain’s overall 
foreign policy  
 
[The organization] was established in 1991 to provide a focused 
approach to the development of the micro enterprise sector by providing 
or seeing to the critical inputs necessary for growth and sustainability  
 
The Group is committed to alleviating poverty; promoting human 
development; science and technology; Islamic economics; banking and 
finance; and enhancing cooperation amongst member countries, in 
collaboration with our development partners 
Commercial 
Financial Institutions 
 
Private Corporations 
 
Microfinance Investment 
Funds 
990 71.40%  $ 1,212,751    
The Company seeks to achieve a commercially acceptable total return 
that will meet or exceed historical returns achieved in the microfinance 
area of the financial sector in emerging markets primarily via long-term 
capital appreciation of portfolio investments 
 
To deliver superior returns to our investors by investing in companies 
improving livelihood or providing access to essential services for low-
income communities in emerging markets          
 
The objective... is to promote microfinance as a viable investment option 
through the development and management of a marketable portfolio of 
high performing MFI funds, each offering "double bottom-line" returns 
comparable with traditional capital market 
Charitable 
Foundations 
 
Non-Governmental 
Organizations 
 
Individual /Peer-to-Peer 
Lenders 
219 3.40%  $  401,283    
Reaching out to the largest number of the poor and disadvantaged 
households with appropriate microfinance services to enable them to 
realize their untapped potentials of development through the network of 
partner [MFO]s   
 
 Through Access to Capital, we work to create economic opportunity for 
people in emerging markets. By opening new doors to financial services 
and property rights, we're helping to foster entrepreneurial behavior, 
economic activity, and job creation. Specifically, we focus on 
microfinance, small-to-medium enterprise, emerging market ventures, 
and property rights 
* 37 of our funders are unknown types.
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Table 2.  MFO Risk Dimensions and Empirical Indicators 
MFO Risk 
Dimensions Indicators* Description** 
Size 
Number of Employees Total number of employees of the MFO 
Total Assets Total of all net asset accounts 
Number of Offices 
Total number of staffed points of service 
and administrative sites used to deliver or 
support the delivery of financial services to 
microfinance clients 
Financial 
Performance 
Return on Assets (Net Operating Income, less Taxes) / Assets 
Operational Self-Sufficiency 
Financial Revenue/(Financial Expense + 
Impairment Loss + Operating Expense) 
Write-Off Ratio Write Offs / Gross Loan Portfolio 
Transparency 
MIX’s Diamond Score 
5-point rating scale to evaluate the quality 
and transparency of an MFO’s financial 
reporting (5 = highest transparency) 
Regulated Dummy 
A dummy variable indicating whether an 
MFO is regulated by a state banking 
supervisory agency 
* All indicators are standardized before the factor analysis 
** All descriptions follow the MIX’s definitions 
   
44 
 
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Key Variables* 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Commercial capital 14.26 4.48 1                   
2 Public capital 8.77 7.29 0.13 1                 
3 GDP per capita 7.30 0.87 0.01 0.06 1               
4 Net ODA (% of GNI) 3.23 4.95 -0.10 -0.08 -0.53 1             
5 Economic globalization 53.39 12.42 0.09 0.01 0.53 -0.05 1           
6 Country distance 21.91 27.10 0.10 -0.03 0.22 0.16 0.43 1         
7 # of active MFOs 38.90 34.23 0.10 0.14 -0.04 -0.39 -0.30 -0.36 1       
8 # of new MFO founded 1.51 2.84 0.05 0.06 -0.11 -0.17 -0.24 -0.21 0.49 1     
9 Industry concentration 0.73 0.23 0.03 0.11 -0.11 -0.24 -0.22 -0.22 0.53 0.13 1   
10 MFO age 13.73 8.90 0.05 0.10 0.09 -0.15 0.04 -0.10 0.01 -0.18 0.11 1 
11 Nonprofit 0.52 0.50 -0.20 -0.14 0.14 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.16 -0.13 -0.04 0.14 
12 Borrowers per loan officer 5.64 0.60 0.08 0.11 -0.08 -0.17 -0.30 -0.21 0.30 0.14 0.21 0.18 
13 Transparency 0.04 0.09 0.29 0.17 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 0.18 0.10 0.09 0.13 
14 Political uncertainty 38.97 6.20 -0.06 0.03 -0.43 0.14 -0.48 -0.10 -0.01 -0.11 0.16 0.13 
15 Financial uncertainty 20.40 7.55 -0.13 -0.06 -0.08 0.52 0.14 0.28 -0.52 -0.31 -0.33 0.00 
16 Size 0.15 0.97 0.19 0.12 -0.12 -0.08 -0.16 -0.13 0.22 0.10 0.08 0.16 
17 Financial performance 0.10 0.43 0.11 0.03 0.05 -0.10 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.08 
18 Political uncertainty X Size 0.62 9.18 0.06 0.04 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.14 
19 Financial uncertainty X Size -1.14 5.43 -0.17 -0.04 0.14 -0.01 0.13 0.11 -0.22 -0.09 -0.07 -0.02 
20 Political uncertainty X Financial performance -0.12 4.20 -0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.07 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.04 0.06 
21 Financial uncertainty X Financial performance -0.27 3.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 -0.14 0.00 -0.03 0.10 -0.02 0.04 0.07 
 
Variables 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
11 Nonprofit 1                     
12 Borrowers per loan officer 0.05 1                   
13 Transparency -0.30 0.13 1                 
14 Political uncertainty 0.06 0.19 0.09 1               
15 Financial uncertainty 0.07 -0.10 -0.19 0.04 1             
16 Size -0.08 0.15 0.76 0.10 -0.14 1           
17 Financial performance 0.00 0.12 0.41 -0.05 -0.08 0.02 1         
18 Political uncertainty X Size 0.04 0.00 0.54 0.04 -0.01 0.73 0.01 1       
19 Financial uncertainty X Size 0.13 -0.17 -0.43 -0.02 -0.05 -0.58 0.05 -0.09 1     
20 Political uncertainty X Financial performance -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 -0.09 -0.04 0.01 -0.33 0.05 0.01 1   
21 Financial uncertainty X Financial performance -0.06 0.06 0.12 -0.06 -0.07 0.04 0.26 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1 
*All correlations equal to or greater than 0.05 are significant (p<.05).
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Table 4a.  Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of MFO Commercial and Public Capital Acquisition  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Commercial Public Commercial Public Commercial Public Commercial Public Commercial Public 
GDP per capita (logged) -2.848 -0.754 -2.953 -0.164 -3.910 -0.616 -1.621 0.678 -2.543 0.289 
 
(2.980) (4.940) (2.971) (4.938) (2.941) (4.942) (2.924) (4.935) (2.910) (4.945) 
Net ODA (% of GNI) 0.256+ 0.400+ 0.278+ 0.411+ 0.220 0.384 0.187 0.354 0.153 0.340 
 
(0.145) (0.240) (0.145) (0.240) (0.143) (0.241) (0.143) (0.241) (0.142) (0.241) 
Economic globalization -0.033 -0.383*** -0.038 -0.389*** -0.046 -0.393*** -0.050 -0.397*** -0.054 -0.399*** 
 
(0.041) (0.068) (0.041) (0.068) (0.041) (0.068) (0.040) (0.068) (0.040) (0.068) 
Country distance 0.025*** -0.006 0.024*** -0.005 0.023*** -0.005 0.023*** -0.006 0.022*** -0.006 
 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
# of active MFOs 0.013 -0.099*** 0.012 -0.097*** 0.015 -0.096*** 0.026+ -0.088*** 0.026+ -0.088*** 
 
(0.014) (0.023) (0.014) (0.023) (0.014) (0.023) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.024) 
# of new MFO founded 0.128* -0.057 0.142** -0.024 0.107* -0.040 0.096+ -0.053 0.075 -0.062 
 
(0.051) (0.085) (0.052) (0.086) (0.052) (0.087) (0.051) (0.087) (0.051) (0.087) 
Industry concentration -4.953* -5.788 -4.994* -5.655 -4.715* -5.523 -5.167* -5.764 -4.925* -5.662 
 
(2.329) (3.862) (2.320) (3.856) (2.294) (3.854) (2.279) (3.848) (2.264) (3.848) 
MFO age 0.053*** 0.101*** 0.049*** 0.100*** 0.047*** 0.099*** 0.038** 0.093*** 0.038** 0.092*** 
 
(0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020) 
Nonprofit -0.917*** -1.825*** -1.443*** -1.531*** -1.404*** -1.513*** -1.371*** -1.486** -1.349*** -1.477** 
 
(0.239) (0.396) (0.276) (0.459) (0.273) (0.458) (0.271) (0.458) (0.269) (0.458) 
Borrowers per loan officer -0.075 0.549 -0.144 0.816* -0.089 0.842* -0.116 0.834* -0.076 0.851* 
 
(0.202) (0.335) (0.210) (0.349) (0.208) (0.349) (0.207) (0.349) (0.205) (0.349) 
Transparency 11.190*** 10.365*** 1.971 14.448** 1.456 14.204** 0.757 13.681** 0.507 13.575** 
 
(1.464) (2.427) (2.791) (4.639) (2.760) (4.638) (2.747) (4.636) (2.728) (4.636) 
Political uncertainty -0.052 -0.084 -0.038 -0.098 -0.022 -0.090 -0.040 -0.099 -0.028 -0.094 
 
(0.073) (0.120) (0.072) (0.120) (0.072) (0.120) (0.071) (0.120) (0.071) (0.120) 
Financial uncertainty -0.102* 0.032 -0.093* 0.025 -0.101** 0.021 -0.034 0.062 -0.048 0.056 
 
(0.040) (0.066) (0.040) (0.066) (0.039) (0.066) (0.040) (0.067) (0.039) (0.067) 
Size 
  
0.851*** -0.156 1.149*** -0.016 3.481*** 1.505* 3.381*** 1.463* 
   
(0.213) (0.354) (0.216) (0.363) (0.396) (0.668) (0.394) (0.669) 
Financial performance 
  
0.668* -1.646* 0.628 -1.665* 0.446 -1.786** 0.443 -1.787** 
   
(0.392) (0.651) (0.387) (0.651) (0.386) (0.651) (0.383) (0.651) 
Political uncertainty X Size 
    
0.313*** 0.148* 
  
0.246*** 0.104 
     
(0.049) (0.083) 
  
(0.050) (0.085) 
Financial uncertainty X Size 
      
0.319*** 0.202** 0.279*** 0.185** 
       
(0.041) (0.069) (0.041) (0.070) 
N 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746 
R squared 0.388 0.328 0.394 0.331 0.408 0.332 0.416 0.334 0.424 0.335 
Wald test (Degrees of freedom) 
  
7.96*** (2) 3.46* (2) 40.03*** (1) 3.17* (1) 61.36*** (1) 8.60** (1) 43.31*** (2) 5.05** (2) 
All models included country- and year-fixed effects.  
Significance levels: + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001. One-tailed test for hypothesized variables and two-tailed test for controls. 
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Table 4b.  Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of MFO Commercial and Public Capital Acquisition  
  (6) (7) (8) 
  Commercial Public Commercial Public Commercial Public 
GDP per capita (logged) -2.820 -0.109 -3.057 -0.211 -2.934 -0.160 
 
(2.965) (4.939) (2.972) (4.941) (2.965) (4.942) 
Net ODA (% of GNI) 0.280+ 0.412+ 0.270+ 0.408+ 0.271+ 0.409+ 
 
(0.144) (0.240) (0.145) (0.241) (0.144) (0.241) 
Economic globalization -0.034 -0.387*** -0.037 -0.389*** -0.033 -0.387*** 
 
(0.041) (0.068) (0.041) (0.068) (0.041) (0.068) 
Country distance 0.024*** -0.005 0.024*** -0.005 0.024*** -0.005 
 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
# of active MFOs 0.010 -0.097*** 0.013 -0.096*** 0.012 -0.097*** 
 
(0.014) (0.023) (0.014) (0.023) (0.014) (0.024) 
# of new MFO founded 0.170** -0.012 0.158** -0.016 0.189*** -0.004 
 
(0.053) (0.088) (0.053) (0.089) (0.054) (0.090) 
Industry concentration -5.311* -5.786 -4.949* -5.635 -5.270* -5.767 
 
(2.318) (3.861) (2.320) (3.858) (2.317) (3.862) 
MFO age 0.050*** 0.100*** 0.050*** 0.100*** 0.051*** 0.100*** 
 
(0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020) 
Nonprofit -1.432*** -1.527*** -1.460*** -1.539*** -1.451*** -1.535*** 
 
(0.275) (0.459) (0.276) (0.459) (0.276) (0.459) 
Borrowers per loan officer -0.124 0.825* -0.133 0.821* -0.110 0.831* 
 
(0.210) (0.350) (0.210) (0.350) (0.210) (0.350) 
Transparency 1.725 14.346** 1.942 14.435** 1.683 14.327** 
 
(2.786) (4.642) (2.791) (4.641) (2.786) (4.644) 
Political uncertainty 0.003 -0.081 -0.033 -0.095 0.010 -0.078 
 
(0.074) (0.123) (0.073) (0.121) (0.074) (0.123) 
Financial uncertainty -0.086* 0.027 -0.095* 0.024 -0.089* 0.026 
 
(0.039) (0.066) (0.040) (0.066) (0.040) (0.066) 
Size 0.880*** -0.145 0.857*** -0.154 0.887*** -0.141 
 
(0.213) (0.355) (0.213) (0.355) (0.213) (0.355) 
Financial performance 0.572 -1.686** 0.561 -1.694* 0.446 -1.742** 
 
(0.392) (0.654) (0.400) (0.666) (0.401) (0.669) 
Political uncertainty X Financial performance -0.175** -0.072 
  
-0.180** -0.075 
 
(0.060) (0.100) 
  
(0.060) (0.101) 
Financial uncertainty X Financial performance 
  
0.054 0.024 0.062 0.028 
   
(0.042) (0.069) (0.042) (0.070) 
N 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746 
R squared 0.397 0.331 0.395 0.331 0.398 0.331 
Wald test (Degrees of freedom) 8.39** (1) 0.52 (1) 1.67 (1) 0.12 (1) 5.30** (2) 0.34 (2) 
All models included country- and year-fixed effects. 
Significance levels: + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001. One-tailed test for hypothesized variables and two-tailed test for controls. 
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Table 5.  The Relationship between MFO Size and Social Outreach 
  
Average           
loan size 
Proportion of 
women 
borrowers 
Size 0.100*** -0.004+ 
 
(0.012) (0.003) 
N 10893 9319 
Log likelihood -6449.854 9052.774 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
 Significance levels: + 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001 
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Figure 1. Plots of Significant Interactions between Political/Financial Uncertainty and MFO Size 
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Figure 2. Plot of Significant Interaction between Political Uncertainty and Financial Performance 
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